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1 
Introduction: Processing types and the role of art
My cross-categorical confusion 
 At the end of the summer before my senior year of college, J.K. Rowling released 
Harry Potter and the Cursed Child.  In high school, my friends and I used to re-read all 
of the first seven Harry Potter books annually, so, as an avid fan of the original stories, 
those close to me assumed that I would be deeply invested in—or would at least 
generally know about—this new addition to that universe. 
 “Do you know how many copies of it have been sold so far?” my friend Dani 
asked me.  We were in her living room, amid the awkward socializing of her middle-aged 
relatives, trying desperately to distract ourselves.   
The two of us always managed to keep pace with each other when re-reading the 
first seven books, and although we had read those countless times, neither of us had 
touched the newest addition yet; we had only heard about it indirectly through articles 
online. One such article was about the book’s success, and coincidentally, I remembered 
having read it earlier that week.  Because it was theoretically still fresh in my mind, I felt 
fairly confident when I quickly answered, “A billion.”   
 Michael, Dani’s cousin, shot me an odd look, as though I were somehow an idiot 
for responding correctly.  “A billion?” he asked, confused.  After waiting for his question 
to sink in, he then added, “You’re not very good at math, are you?  How could a billion 
people buy it already when it just came out a few days ago?” 
  
 
2 
 And, yes, with seven billion people in the world, I can see now that it would be 
unlikely that 15% of the entire earth would go out to buy J.K. Rowling’s newest 
installation in the Harry Potter universe after only a few days, no matter how popular the 
book series is.  At the time, though, I was a bit too peeved at being called dim-witted to 
logically think through this, and I remained irrationally defensive of my original answer. 
 Dani, having known me for years by that point, immediately took my side.  “I 
think it was like 680,000.  That’s still a lot.”  Not close to a billion, but she was kind 
enough not to point that out. 
 Michael clearly still doubted my intelligence.   
 I realized what had happened moments later.  680-thousand—a bright green 
number, a deeper green number, and a bright green letter.  6-8-t.  It was so similar to the 
deep green of b and the bright green of l in “billion”—similar enough that I was unable to 
get to the actual answer, instead hung up on the physical stimulus of the color green. 
 You see, I have synesthesia, a neurological condition that is named for its 
tendency to bring sensations together.  Some estimates posit that it affects approximately 
4% of the general population, although the actual number of those afflicted is unknown 
given that many people do not know they have it (Banissy, Jonas, & Kadosh, 2014).  It 
“involves the automatic activation of unusual concurrent experiences in response to 
ordinary inducing stimuli” (Meier & Rothen, 2015).  In other words, one stimulus causes 
someone to experience two or more responses that may not normally go together.  And 
these are not just any automatic responses to stimuli; instead, synesthesia includes 
“certain stimulus in one modality” that causes automatic “unusual extra sensations in 
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other modalities, such as seeing or feeling colours while listening to music or 
personifying of letters and numbers” (Mikuš, 2013).  This crossing of modalities can 
occur in any number of combinations, with up to 60 known variants (Banissy, Jonas, & 
Kadosh, 2014).  Colors are often associated with numbers, letters, smells, and sounds.  
Tastes can be induced by certain words.  Pain can even have a certain color and texture to 
it.  In their review of synesthesia, Rocco Chiou and Anina Rich (2014) make the 
following claim:  
Although subjective experiences vary across individuals, the majority of [non-
synesthetes] seem to perceive the world in a similar way, providing a common 
ground for communication…For individuals with synesthesia, however, the 
experience of the environment can be quite different from the rest of us.   
This definition does indeed touch on very important issues, but it should also be noted 
here that there is no established uniformity in either synesthetic or non-synesthetic 
thoughts.  In other words, those without synesthesia have unique viewpoints in that their 
life experiences impact the ways in which they interact with their world, and those with 
synesthesia have these same variable experiences as well as their own unique form of 
cross-modal thinking.  Although these issues with such an assertion of general uniformity 
across people’s perceptions of the world do exist, the fact that synesthesia fundamentally 
alters experiences of set stimuli remains salient in this claim by Chiou and Rich.  
Synesthetic encounters, varying even from synesthete to synesthete, often result in a 
blurring of schematic categories that pushes outside of top-down processing and induces 
bottom-up.  Indeed, one theory regarding the neural cause of synesthesia “suggests that 
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synesthesia results from a ‘glitch’ of the inhibitory circuitry that fails to suppress 
crosstalk between brain areas, which is normally inhibited in the non-synesthetic brain” 
(Chiou & Anina, 2014).  Although the hypothesized correlates for such cross-talk are still 
up for debate, the effect posited in their article is confirmed by synesthete’s self-reports.  
This “crosstalk between brain areas” allows for cross-modal and cross-categorical 
perceptions of the world that deviate from the “norm.”   
As a result of this, for me, the numbers 8 and 6 and the letters b and l all produce 
an involuntary feeling of green in my mind.  Being synesthetic, having my senses crossed 
like this, I was unable to perceive six hundred and eighty thousand without 
simultaneously recording the colors of each aspect of that number.  It was such a green 
number, after all, and when recalling the information, I could only remember the green of 
it.  I consequently responded with the first intensely green number I could think of—a 
billion.   
 
Top-down processing and categorizing the world 
 When we perceive a stimulus, we automatically categorize—that is to say, we 
interpret a stimulus as being part of some pre-existing conceptual category.  Because 
there are so many sights, smells, sounds, and more that we experience on any given day, 
such categorization allows us to process our exterior world quickly and efficiently.  For 
example, we see a dog, and although it may be a different breed of dog than any we have 
seen before, we still place it under the general overarching term of “dog.”  The same 
thing occurs when we hear a number, or see a color, or perceive an emotion on 
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someone’s face.  External stimuli are classified “according to certain principles, such as 
perceptual similarities, semantic rules or theories, implications for goal states, or evoked 
emotional responses” (Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010).   This categorization allows us 
to discriminate between types of objects, permitting us to distinguish a cat from a dog 
based on their differences while recognizing that Australian Shepherds and German 
Shepherds still belong to the same group, despite their variations from one another. 
 Top-down processing, wherein certain schemata are imposed upon a stimulus, is 
especially important in the categorization of our external world, and its goal is to make 
our observation of these externalities more efficient (Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010).  
These schemata are flexible enough to allow Australian Shepherds and German 
Shepherds—two very different breeds in appearance—to both be classified as dogs, while 
still maintaining the differences well enough to separate this group from cats.  Similarly, 
if we see a light in the sky, it is through the imposition of schemata and the establishment 
of distinct categories that we are able to differentiate between, say, the sun, the moon, 
stars, and a street lamp.  Top-down processing is therefore instrumental in allowing us to 
know the distinctions between discrete categories, which may include letters, numbers, 
and colors.  Imposing these categories and creating that mental efficiency certainly have 
adaptive advantages for humans.  Hullinger, Kruschke, and Todd (2015) note that one 
advantage of only selectively attending to stimuli is to keep external “input complexity 
within an organism’s processing capacity limitations.”  In other words, imposing 
categories on the exterior world allows for less over-stimulation in an individual.  
Utilizing top-down processing additionally permits humans to grasp rule-based tasks 
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more quickly, as top-down processing essentially involves the formation and 
commitment to a given set of rules.  Smith et al. (2012) believe that the emergence of 
“rule learning could have been an important step in primates’ cognitive evolution,” with 
“rule learning” being associated with top-down categorization.  This ability to impose 
and follow rules in perception has likely proven advantageous throughout our 
evolutionary history, leading to its near-fixation in our species.  By creating a more 
efficient mode of perception, we are less susceptible to sensory overload or to over-
stimulation. 
 Top-down categorization is at work in every part of our lives.  Even when trying 
to read over someone’s messy handwriting, we are actively engaging in top-down 
processing, using our knowledge of context and syntax to fill in the areas in which the 
writing has become too illegible to actually read on its own (Barnhart, & Goldinger, 
2010).  And this method is definitely helpful, as I would have a much harder time 
deciphering the “chicken-scratch” that some of my professors put on the board without 
the use of these schemata.  With regard to language specifically, top-down perception 
becomes increasingly prevalent throughout childhood development (Bitan et al., 2009).  
Many researchers have posited the nascence of heavy cross-modal connections, meaning 
that this developmental increase in top-down processing later in life represents a re-
writing of our latent perceptive techniques (Spector & Maurer, 2009).  As this re-writing 
continues, we increasingly rely on top-down schemata to assist us in understanding our 
environments.   
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Bottom-up processing and movement between categories 
 Of course, for me, these categories blur together more than they would for a non-
synesthete, meaning that my cross-modal associations do not stop at such situations as the 
bouba/kiki effect.  The letter b, the number 8, and deep green are all intrinsically tied in 
my mind.  Top-down processing glitches here, because the categories are not separate 
enough as to make my outward perception of the world more efficient.  The resulting 
cross-categorical interaction was inexplicable to Dani and Michael, both of whom do not 
regularly deal with any dramatic disruptions in their top-down view of the world. 
Although top-down categorization dominates much of non-synesthetic thought, it 
is by no means the only way in which to view the world, with bottom-up processing 
methods appearing at the other end of this perceptive spectrum.  In the privileging of 
bottom-up processing, which breaks from the strict categorization of top-down, 
individuals unconsciously construct a world of experiences and materiality; in privileging 
top-down processing, conversely, individuals quickly dismiss the physical artifice or 
sensations elicited from their environments in order to get at the conceptual content that 
the stimulus conveys.  The latter involves relatively barren efficiency, while the former 
creates a far richer and less efficient experience.  Because cross-modality creates a 
situation in which non-categorical sensations are elicited with each stimulus, its disregard 
for categories and general focus on sensation and materiality allow it to be associated 
with bottom-up thinking in the same way that it is distanced from a top-down or 
categorical world. 
  
 
8 
Conditions such as synesthesia and autism spectrum disorders often increase the 
level of bottom-up processing—that is, processing based on the stimulus itself rather than 
on the schema to which the stimulus is subjected—until it becomes more common than it 
would be in so-called “neurotypical” individuals, or individuals without such conditions.  
In a study on visual reasoning in autistic children, Takesaki et al. (2016) found there to be 
“increased bottom-up connectivity from the visual areas,” thereby making this sort of 
thinking more common in visual reasoning, something that might not be the case for a 
“neurotypical” individual.  If we simply assume a top-down system, then, we are 
neglecting the viewpoints of entire groups of people for whom top-down is not 
necessarily the default mode of perception.  This general adherence to a top-down 
mindset signifies a corresponding and often involuntary lack of empathy for those who 
differ from that mindset.  Although this lapse is likely not meant maliciously, addressing 
it by increasing the variety of depicted perceptual techniques can still have a profound 
impact on allowing for more empathy for cross-modal, bottom-up thinkers. 
Many things today—from sexuality to autism—are widely regarded as containing 
a spectrum along which people will fall rather than merely being a strict one-or-the-other 
situation (e.g., modern observations on sexuality).  The same is arguably true for top-
down and bottom-up processing.  The aforementioned study discussing the increased 
bottom-up connectivity in autistic children arises in comparison to an average level of 
bottom-up connectivity in non-autistic children.  People with autism or synesthesia would 
therefore stereotypically fall more toward the bottom-up end of the spectrum, and those 
without such conditions might stray toward top-down more often than not.  Even still, 
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few people in either category mentioned (bottom-up-biased or top-down-biased 
individuals) would exist purely on one end of this spectrum.  This is what I mean in 
calling top-down perception the default in a large portion of the population—not that it is 
the only way in which people without certain conditions can perceive the world, but that 
it is the mode of processing on which they rely more heavily.  Top-down categorization 
assists many of us in sorting information efficiently and quickly, and it allows us to focus 
on the content of a given stimulus as soon as possible.  That is not to say, however, that 
we do not occasionally focus on the exteriority of the stimulus rather than on what it 
means; this is where instances of bottom-up processing might temporarily take over.  I, 
for example, enjoy listening to music in French, in spite of the fact that I cannot 
understand a single word of the language itself.  The sound of it is sufficient, and I hardly 
care what the words mean.  I am sure that many people have had similar experiences, 
regardless of how heavily they rely on top-down processing in their everyday lives. 
Of course, even with this spectrum in existence, it would be difficult for me to 
simply expect Dani and her cousin to understand my thought processes all the time, as 
they see the world very differently than I do because they may fall further toward the top-
down end than me.  I engage in much more bottom-up thinking than they would ever 
need to, just as someone else with a different form of synesthesia might be even more 
involved in that sort of thinking than even I am.  Although there is a spectrum of 
processing, it is much less common for those who favor top-down perception to be 
induced into abandoning those particular categorization methods than it is for those who 
engage in more bottom-up views to experience life from the other end of the continuum.  
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Dani and her cousin might therefore happily remain in their top-down-default world 
without ever seeing occasion to be forced out of that for long periods of time, while I am 
constantly reading books that force me to see the world in a far more categorized way 
than I typically do. 
 For Dani and Michael, it would have probably been less confusing for them if I 
had answered Dani’s initial question with 1,000,000,000 simply because I remembered 
seeing a large number (680,000) in the article and responded back with another large 
number in order to fit that pattern.  When my justification for my mistake was based on 
the color rather than the number, it was difficult for them to understand this crossing of 
categories.  Confusion within a category is fairly standard (e.g., it would make sense for 
me to be unable to recall whether I had perceived dark green or light green), whereas 
confusion between categories is less common (Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010).  As a 
result, my lack of distinction between numbers, letters, and colors was more difficult for 
Dani and Michael to understand.  A particularly important method for forcing bottom-up 
processing in the place of top-down would therefore be to interrupt these categories or to 
engage in cross-modal language as a method of synthesizing a disruption of their top-
down worldview. 
 
Role of literature in the abandonment of top-down views 
 Engaging in cross-modal language and inhabiting a bottom-up-dominant mindset 
might be a difficult thing to accomplish on one’s own, and thus some guided descriptions 
written from that cross-modal, bottom-up perspective might be useful.  Literature can 
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very easily accomplish this task, as it creates a world the reader can temporarily inhabit 
that may be different from that which they generally know.  Of course, such guided 
literature would need to include cross-modal language and would need to stray from the 
traditional categorical descriptions to which we have habituated over time. 
While addressing an adjacent issue in his essay Art as Technique, influential 
literary critic Viktor Shklovsky establishes a clear distinction between poetic language, 
such as might appear in a work of art, and practical language, which would be used in 
everyday speech.  Shklovsky saw practical language as preserving an “economy of 
energy,” meaning that the speaker uses as few words as possible to get across their point 
(Shklovsky, 1965).  Practical language generally aims at maximal categorization on all 
phonetic levels, with efficiency of communication as the main goal.  Poetic language, on 
the other hand, is meant to “make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to 
increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an 
aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged” (Shklovsky, 1965).  Essentially, Shklovsky 
views artistic language as forcing the viewer to focus on a particular representation 
because the language makes the represented object unfamiliar to them.  Because 
everyday life can become easily habituated, an observer may not have a profound 
experience from merely seeing or reading about another manifestation of all that they 
already know; however, such an experience might be had if the familiar objects were 
framed in such a drastically different way as to become unrecognizable.  This mimics the 
distinction noted above between literature that allows us to inhabit an entirely different 
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mindset and that which merely perpetuates the same general top-down schemata on the 
environment. 
 Furthermore, practical language, which strives to achieve that “economy of 
energy,” would simply present the world in familiar and accepted categories so as to 
convey a message in the clearest possible way.  Such language allows us to impose our 
pre-determined schemata on the world and to maintain our categorical perceptions.  So, if 
we view top-down operational speech as simply maintaining familiar groupings of 
stimuli, then cross-modal literary techniques (i.e., those that induce a blurring between 
groupings) are therefore considered aesthetic under Shklovsky’s definition, as these 
techniques de-familiarize their subjects enough to disrupt the standard top-down 
processing someone might attempt when exposed to a story.  Again, this suggests that a 
story involving unique, de-familiarizing cross-modal connections ought to be considered 
more poetic than one that offers the same connections in the same categories as exist in 
daily life. 
 This distinction between the language of speech and the language of art can be 
easily observed in our everyday experiences.  The other day, I was talking to my friend 
about someone who sits next to me in one of my classes.  “He seems like a nice kid,” I 
told her, “but he’s been sick for about two weeks, and I can smell it on him.”  This is a 
fairly straightforward description, and it would hardly require my friend to mediate on it 
for more than a second or two before working out precisely what I meant in saying it.  
According to Shklovsky, prose, or practical language, is “economical, easy, [and] proper” 
(Shklovsky, 1965). Because this statement is so easy to comprehend, and because it 
  
 
13 
would require minimal mental effort from both my friend and myself, my statement about 
the smell of a kid with a cold would be considered practical language.  
 If I intended to document this incident in the form of a short story, however, I 
would almost certainly approach the description differently.  Instead of being so direct in 
my statement, I might say, Every day he sits beside me, and as nice as he is in 
personality, I cannot get over the smell of him.  That smell.  That sickly, grainy orange 
hue laid overtop an equally sickly olive green.  The scent of it has hung heavy over him 
for two weeks now.  This is not quite so straightforward as my practical conversation with 
my friend, if only because it is never explicitly states that the smell of illness on my 
classmate is the thing that is invoking these sensations in me.  This therefore de-
familiarizes the scent of an illness on someone.  Additionally, smell and color overlap 
here in a way that they naturally do in my mind, but for someone without synesthesia, 
this statement might be a bit more jarring.  Even to a synesthete, this description of colors 
would still cause prolonged perception of the image (the associated color of the smell), as 
synesthetes tend to vary in their color perceptions.  Normative descriptions of smell—and 
even “normative” descriptions of smell for someone who links that to color—are 
disrupted and made unfamiliar here, and mental effort is prolonged rather than 
economized.  Consequently, this is aesthetic language.   
In order to induce bottom-up thinking in someone who might otherwise avoid it, 
then, artistic language can be an excellent method, especially artistic language according 
to Shklovsky’s de-familiarizing definition.  Because of this ability to de-familiarize 
traditional structures, literature is the prime place in which to induce bottom-up 
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processing instead of top-down processing.  When encouraged to view the text from this 
different lens, even those who favor top-down thinking in everyday life will be able to 
witness what the alternative viewpoint might be.  Because we see the lives of others 
through reading, literature already helps us to cultivate empathy by exposing us to 
different personalities and situations than those to which we have become accustomed 
(Turner, 2013), where empathy is defined as “the ability to understand and appreciate 
another person’s feelings, experiences, etc.” (OED, 2014).  By employing cross-modal 
language to promote bottom-up processing, literature can further serve as a great 
promoter of empathy by allowing us to adopt the mindset of someone else, both in terms 
of their opinions and in their very method of viewing their environment. 
 
Going forward 
Throughout the remainder of this work, my own definitions of the different 
language types will be based upon Shklovsky’s views on this subject: “practical 
language” will be that which allows both listener and speaker to limit mental effort while 
adhering fairly strictly to a top-down or categorical structure with regard to information 
processing, and “artistic language” will be that which de-familiarizes formerly familiar 
things or groupings for the reader and requires an increase in the process of perception 
that deviates from the norm established by practical language. 
 In the upcoming chapters, I will begin by noting some of the limitations of uni-
modal techniques—or those that do not interfere with categorical perceptions—in 
literature.  I will then explain the ways in which cross-modal techniques avoid these 
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limitations and more effectively de-familiarize the reader.  Upon establishing cross-
modal devices as clearer examples of true artistic language than uni-modal devices, I will 
explain the ways in which the resulting change in processing mimics the way in which 
many people (e.g., synesthetes and those with autism) naturally process the external 
world.  In causing readers to truly take on the mental perceptions of someone else, artistic 
language is therefore in the unique position of being able to cultivate real empathy after 
simply reading a literary work. 
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Limitations of pure top-down processing
Habitualization of imagery 
“Art is thinking in images.”  Shklovsky quotes this particular maxim in his 
influential work, Art as Technique.  He, of course, disagrees with the simplistic view that 
art is reducible to thinking in images.  In fact, when addressing this school of thought, he 
claims, “But we find that images change little; from century to century, from nation to 
nation, from poet to poet, they flow on without changing.  Images belong to no one” 
(Shklovsky, 1965).  Even in this statement, it is possible to feel the habitualization 
occurring.  Time flows on; people pass through; images remain constant.  With this 
constancy of the image itself and the continual movement of humanity, what once might 
have been a unique perception of the world is soon internalized to the point where it is no 
longer novel: “After we have seen an object several times, we begin to recognize it.  The 
object is in front of us and we know about it, but we do not see it—hence we cannot say 
anything significant about it” (Shklovsky, 1965).  In other words, as we are repeatedly 
exposed to certain objects and situations, we become habituated to those sources of 
stimulus in our environment.  Habituation presents itself as one form of top-down 
categorization in that it allows for the quick and efficient perception of certain common 
stimuli.  Over time, those stimuli and images—most of which appeal to only one sense 
modality—quickly become exhausted.  Because they fall so easily into discrete 
categories, and because they are so common, they eventually become entirely 
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overlooked.  This is especially prevalent in regard to literature, as our employment of top-
down processing—and consequently our ability to habituate—in language increases with 
development (Bitan et al., 2009).  While language and literature are indeed different, the 
use of language in literature is essential, as the latter cannot exist without some use of the 
former.  As we gradually rely more and more on top-down processing when involved 
with language, we also alter the ways in which we perceive how that language is used, 
meaning that we might expect some corresponding change in literary perception as a 
result of this over-writing reliance on top-down processing. 
With this increasing default of categorical perception of language, with the 
overuse of certain stock images throughout literature, it is no wonder we have exhausted 
certain metaphors and modes of storytelling.  These exhausted images that, according to 
Shklovsky, we no longer see as a result of their habituation become what is sometimes 
referred to as “dead metaphors.”  A dead metaphor is merely that which “has become 
commonplace and idiomatic” to the point of losing literary meaning (Postnikoff, 2010).  
The imposed category for such a phrase becomes so strong as to overpower the more 
literal sensation the phrase originally invoked.  When a character speaks of “falling in 
love,” for example, it is generally understood what emotion they are feeling, but the 
connotation behind “falling” into it is often lost in today’s world.  It has become such a 
standardized expression that there is no longer any recognition of the original idea of 
plunging down into an emotional state of attachment to another person.  This phrase can 
arguably not be considered art any longer, as its arousal of sensation in the reader has 
been reduced to nothing beyond the accepted schematic created for it.  Though certain 
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linguists do take issue with the term “dead metaphor,” the principle behind the concept is 
undeniable (Postnikoff, 2010).  Some images are repeated relentlessly by countless 
writers and become so easily recognized by readers that they lose much of their impact.   
This habitualization of imagery is the result of top-down and categorical 
processing of the world, and because it allows for an economy of mental effort on behalf 
of the reader, it therefore changes historically poetic language into practical language.  If 
literature fails to defy this top-down mode of thinking, then we risk poetic language 
devolving into purely practical language when readers can too easily habituate to it.  
Indeed, for Shklovsky, any language that fails to de-familiarize its readers is not literature 
at all, even if it occurs in a form that is recognized as literary. 
 
Alienation of cross-modal thinkers  
In addition to risking the perpetuation of dead metaphors, writers who create 
works that are solely for top-down thinkers also alienate those who might not think in 
such a heavily schematized way.  By limiting literature to a solely top-down perspective, 
writers promote an erasure of the “other” while privileging the more “normal” self.  I 
previously mentioned how synesthetes might vary from non-synesthetes in terms of 
general perception, and it is fitting to reiterate that point here, especially given that 
synesthetic metaphor is often one method used to combat mere economical or practical 
language.  Synesthetic brains may be more inclined to engage in non-categorical or 
bottom-up processing rather than categorical or top-down, making the use of strictly top-
down structures in literature an unsatisfying experience for a synesthete: not only would 
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it be too easy to habituate, but it would also ignore the real-life modes of thinking that 
synesthetes might prefer.   
I also previously mentioned that those with autism spectrum disorders commonly 
experience increased prevalence of bottom-up reliance.  In addition to these general 
observations on the possible preference in those with autism for that particular end of the 
processing spectrum, similar experiences with cross-modality are frequently reported in 
autistic individuals.  Indeed, the rate of synesthesia is three times higher in autistic 
individuals than it is in the general population (Baron-Cohen et al., 2013).  Such results 
have led researchers to posit a genetic correlation between the two conditions (Neufeld et 
al., 2013).  Beyond this likely genetic correlation, both autism spectrum disorders and 
synesthesia present with many similar neurological differences.  Increased connectivity 
has been observed in the brains of both autistic individuals and synesthetes (Courchesne 
et al. 2009; Haenggi, Wotruba, & Jancke, 2011).  With these increased neurological 
connections, there appears to be more entwined associations between local networks and 
adjacent areas of the brain in both of these conditions (Casanova & Trippe, 2009; 
Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2005).  Not only are synesthetic and autistic brains different 
than the “norm,” but the two conditions actually resemble one another in certain ways 
that indicate some genetic linkage between them.  In both cases, cross-modality is more 
prevalent than in “normal” individuals, meaning that the overall rate of bottom-up 
processing likely increases as well.  Reading top-down-biased literature, then, prevents 
both synesthetes and those autism from connecting fully to the story being told. 
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Subconscious alienation of the self 
While top-down categorical language in literature may seem to only alienate 
cross-modal thinkers, it actually can restrict even a top-down-dominant individual’s 
ability to engage with the work as well.  In fact, in spite of their neurological differences, 
synesthetes and non-synesthetes share certain perceptions about the world.  According to 
one prominent hypothesis, the cross-modality observed in early childhood, when not re-
written fully, can manifest as synesthesia; synesthetic-like perceptions are therefore 
present in early childhood and can still “persist in muted form even in typical adults” 
(Spector & Maurer, 2009).  While most prominent in bottom-up processors such as 
children and synesthetes, certain cross-modal connections may still appear in the general 
population.  For example, Rich et al. (2005) surveyed 150 synesthetes and assessed 
patterns in their letter-color associations; interestingly, this study also found related 
patterns within the letter-color associations present in non-synesthetes who were 
interviewed and asked to pair letters with colors.  In a similar study, Simner et al. (2005) 
observed relatedness between synesthete and non-synesthete participants in terms of 
grapheme-color links, and they concluded that synesthetes merely feel these associations 
involuntarily, whereas non-synesthetes are capable of coming up with similar color 
patterns but only when prompted.  It seems that everyone might be capable of some sort 
of synesthetic experience, meaning that on some level non-synesthetes are able to 
understand synesthetic-type thinking if it were presented to them.  This capacity for 
cross-modal experience might be heightened by the de-familiarizing effect that 
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Shklovsky attributes to poetic language, as this de-familiarization induces bottom-up 
processing in both synesthetes and non-synesthetes alike. 
This latent capacity for cross-modal thinking in all people becomes especially 
apparent when looking specifically at the ability of sound symbolism to act as a de-
familiarizing device.  Sound symbolism “refers to the ability of particular word sounds or 
phonemes…to convey information and hence influence perceptions” (Coulter & Coulter, 
2013).  This is not a conscious choice on behalf of either reader or writer, but it instead 
represents a foregrounding of the materiality or stimulus of the sound itself.  Because the 
materiality of the sound requires no knowledge of the sound’s meaning, this represents a 
pre-categorical perception, or a perception that exists before top-down categorization of 
the sound occurs.  Additionally, because sound symbolism emphasizes the stimulus itself 
rather than the content, this literary device is reflective of bottom-up and cross-modal 
processing methods.  One of the 
most well-documented examples of 
this is the so-called bouba/kiki effect 
(Figure 1), wherein non-synesthetic 
individuals name a rounded shape 
“bouba” and a sharp shape “kiki” 
based solely on the inherent cross-
modal associations that occur with 
the sound of each word (Köhler, 
1929). 
 
Figure 1: An illustration of the shapes deemed 
“bouba,” on the left, and “kiki,” on the right, with 
the sound of “bouba” lending itself to a universally 
more rounded shape, while “kiki” appears to 
resemble a universally sharper shape.  This 
demonstrates the ability of sound symbolism to 
impact perception.  Retrieved from Fort, Martin, 
and Peperkamp (2015). 
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 Linguist Reuven Tsur (1992) explores this in his book, What makes sound 
patterns expressive?: The poetic mode of speech perception.  Tsur notes that “people may 
have intuitions that certain vowel contrasts correspond to BRIGHTNESS~DARKNESS” and 
that “poets may more frequently use words that contain dark vowels in lines referring to 
dark colors, mystic obscurity, or slow and heavy movement, or in depicting hatred and 
struggle.”  Though there is nothing overt about back vowels (so named for the placement 
of the tongue in forming their sounds) that makes them appear physically darker, these 
innate associations are such that they come through in linguistic analysis and in the 
composition of poetry or prose.  This sort of innate association is made even more 
prevalent during a so-called “thought-experiment” conducted by Tsur in which he asks 
his friends and family, “Which sound is more metallic, /b/ or /g/?”   
Inspired by this, I immediately called my mom and asked, “Would you say ‘ba’ or 
‘ga’ is more metallic-sounding?” 
My mom answered, “Ga,” without hesitation. 
Later, when working with four of my classmates, I again asked, “Would you say 
‘ba’ or ‘ga’ is more metallic?”  
And, again, they all immediately answered, “Ga.” 
These results are hardly revolutionary, as Tsur, in his questioning of his own 
friends and family, found precisely the same thing.  Everyone to whom Tsur spoke 
identified “ga” as the more metallic sound.  This is interesting, as it suggests that there is 
some sort of automatic connection between metal and “ga” that many people are capable 
of perceiving. 
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More interesting than that, perhaps, is the fact that no one interviewed by Tsur—
and indeed no one I interviewed either—was confused about the question. 
“No one questions the question,” I pointed out to my mom and later to my friends.  
“No one thinks it’s weird for me to be asking for a metal sound in regard to two different 
letters.” 
At that point, and only then, did those to whom I was speaking actually ask me 
why I was interested in such a thing.  Tsur similarly notes that any interrogation from his 
companions only occurred after they had given their response, meaning that the link 
between consonant sounds and varying degrees of metallic-ness was more easily 
recognized than the oddity of the categorical crossing that occurs when considering the 
question in the first place.  The immediate response (“ga”) and lack of immediate 
confusion (“why this question?”) further strengthen the hypothesis of an innate blurring 
between categorical perceptions that goes overlooked in everyday life.  The sound 
symbolism of more metallic sounds somehow fits with a pre-categorical perception of the 
phoneme /g/.  When someone hears “ga,” they do not register the metallic sound of it 
until they are questioned specifically about its similarity to metal.  This shows the degree 
to which top-down processing filters out extraneous and cross-categorical stimuli.  The 
connection is there in a pre-categorical context, but because it does not fit with the 
economical schemata set in place by this processing method, the brain fails to recognize 
it until prompted to do so. 
Both scientific and linguistic evidence suggest a sort of synesthetic experience 
that everyone is capable of having, but insistence on representing the world in this 
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economical way prevents people from engaging with this oft-neglected part of their own 
perceptions.   In order to encourage bottom-up processing in those that might not 
automatically engage in it, synesthetic language—also referred to as cross-modal 
language—becomes especially relevant.  Because there are so many latent synesthetic 
associations tied to language, foregrounding that in literature can allow the reader to 
connect with a typically concealed part of themselves and can also foster new insights 
into the minds of others by breaking them out of their traditional mindsets. 
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Through Benjy’s eyes: bottom-up perceptions in The Sound and the Fury
Sound symbolism, cross-modal metaphor, and de-familiarization are all literary 
techniques that appear in many stories, though de-familiarization is perhaps the easiest to 
observe given the relatively simply adjustments to a narrative that can bring it about.  
Even altering the perspective from which the story is told can have a de-familiarizing 
effect.  The most common perspectives used in literature—at least in my experience as an 
English major—are third person limited and first person.  Both of these techniques allow 
the reader to track the progress of a specific character throughout a particular set of 
circumstances.  With only one character to inhabit, the reader can become more deeply 
invested in that character and can better understand their particular worldview.  And, 
generally, this is how stories are told. 
 Of course, deviation from this norm in the form of switching perspectives 
certainly has a de-familiarizing effect, especially if each perspective differs drastically 
from the rest.  This is something that William Faulkner does in his novel The Sound and 
the Fury.  The book takes place in four sections, each with a different narrator and, 
consequently, a different style.  Breaking it up like this places emphasis on disorienting 
the reader by preventing them from becoming too involved in any particular character’s 
set of experiences or style of storytelling.  This creates that same de-familiarizing effect 
noted earlier while also theoretically allowing the reader to become briefly familiar with 
many different modes of perception. 
  
 
26 
The first chapter is arguably the most difficult to understand, as it is written from 
the perspective of a man, Benjy Compson, with drastic mental handicaps.  As such, 
Faulkner constructs Benjy’s narrative in such a way that we as readers are forced to only 
view the world in the cross-modal way that Benjy does, although this transition into his 
mindset might be more abrupt for someone of a “neurotypical” mindset.  In this way, 
Faulkner disorients the reader further than a break in narration would otherwise allow by 
immediately thrusting us into the unfamiliar mind of Benjy.  His particular brand of 
thinking promotes bottom-up processing of external stimuli in a way that deviates from 
the “normal” perceptual experience of many people, as I will demonstrate here. 
 
Benjy and bottom-up disruption 
 There are several unique points of cross-categorical confusion that occur in 
Benjy’s section of the novel, one of which happens when he notes, “The sun was cold 
and bright” (Faulkner, 1929/1994).  We generally know that the sun is associated with 
brightness and heat, and the cold has no real place in our category “sun.”  This creates a 
moment of confusion for the reader as the actual object Benjy perceives becomes unclear.  
The words themselves are familiar, but the combination is essentially novel.  This move 
is reminiscent of one of the final lines of William Wordsworth’s poem, “The Idiot Boy,” 
in which a mentally handicapped boy, after getting sidetracked in the woods for several 
hours, comments, “The sun did shine so cold” (Wordsworth, 1798/2008).  In this poem, 
as critic Richard Cronin (2014) helpfully points out, the boy refers to the moon as a cold, 
shining sun, as this is simply what he knows it as in his own worldview: “The boy does 
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not compare…the moon to the sun: he sees one as the other.”   The same occurs in The 
Sound and the Fury with Benjy, where his limited vocabulary allows him to focus on 
things in a new light.  “Distant,” “natural,” “bright,” “hot”—all of these descriptors are 
easily applied to “sun” in our minds.  The schemata we impose on our perception of the 
sun allows for this.  This is not an entirely flexible schema, however, as we cannot add 
“cold” into the list of descriptors and still hope to reconcile that with our perception of 
what the sun is.  This is what makes the passage so de-familiarizing and so difficult for 
the reader to process.  It branches out from our somewhat flexible category of sun-
descriptions in a way that does not fit with what we know to be true about the sun.  Here, 
our top-down approach fails.  We cannot hope to see Benjy’s world while struggling to 
reconcile all of his perceptions with rigid, known schemata.  Because of this, we as 
readers are left to merely view the sun as Benjy sees it and to accept that it did shine 
bright and cold that day.  In that moment, we take on an imperfect approximation of his 
consciousness, so different from our own that it at first seems challenging. 
 Here, I would like to take a brief moment to note the importance of this 
association between Benjy and Wordsworth’s “Idiot Boy.”  Wordsworth’s poem occurs 
in a collection he composed with Samuel Taylor Coleridge, wherein the two of them 
attempted a fairly novel task: “[These poems] were written chiefly with a view to 
ascertain how far the language of conversation in the middle and lower classes of society 
is adapted to the purposes of poetic pleasure” (Wordsworth, 1798/2008).  This might 
seem like the exact opposite of the poetic language Shklovsky desires, given that 
Wordsworth admits to wanting to write in the common dialect.  However, during 
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Wordsworth’s time, such practical language in a poetic medium rarely occurred, so his 
use of simpler phrasing in his poems actually prolonged mental effort because of its break 
from the poetic norm in a way that Shklovsky might appreciate.  It is significant here that 
Faulkner’s words so resemble Wordsworth’s, who at his time was striving to redefine the 
nature of poetry.  While there is no direct evidence that Faulkner used Wordsworth’s 
character as a model for Benjy, the correlation allows us as readers to draw parallels 
between Wordsworth’s boldly “common” poetry and Faulkner’s use of such a 
dramatically “atypical” narrator. 
Moving back to The Sound and the Fury, Benjy follows his initial observation on 
the unfamiliar moon with descriptions of how he “could smell the bright cold” (Faulkner, 
1929/1994).  Smelling a temperature is a bit odd, though not overly difficult to imagine, 
but given that “bright” and “cold” are both descriptors used on the same page to describe 
the moon, this suggests that Benjy can smell the moon itself.  Of course, as a reader, this 
claim is disorienting, as the moon really is much too far away to smell, but because Benjy 
cannot clarify his meaning, we are left to interpret this passage as showing his ability to 
smell the bright cold air and the moon.  This is very different than the ways in which we 
would normally perceive both of these things—a chill in the air is typically felt, and the 
moon is typically seen—and as a result, it de-familiarizes each part of Benjy’s 
environment from what we are used to seeing in our own everyday lives.  Again, our 
usual schemata by which we categorize external stimuli becomes nearly impossible to 
impose, with “cold,” “distant,” and “sun” all being as irreconcilable as “cold,” “distant,” 
and “smell” are.  With that, we sink a bit deeper into his materialistic world. 
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 These two instances are not the only ones in which Benjy confuses his perceptual 
senses from what might be more recognizable to readers.  Later in his section, he notes, 
“I couldn’t see it, but my hands saw it, and I could hear it getting night, and my hands 
saw the slipper but I couldn’t see myself, but my hands could see the slipper, and I 
squatted there, hearing it getting dark” (Faulkner, 1994).  This is an incredibly rich 
passage, invoking a blurring of senses through its wording.  Benjy “sees” the slipper he 
holds with his hands.  He “hears” it getting dark.  If I were to write about this scene in my 
own life, I might say, I couldn’t see the slipper, but I could feel it with my hands, and all I 
could see was the darkness.  Even more than just those de-familiarizing observations in 
themselves, Benjy repeats each phrase, meaning that he asserts his hearing-with-eyes and 
his sight-with-hands two and three times, respectively, in this sentence.  Benjy’s certainty 
that he is seeing the slipper with his hands and that he is hearing the darkness emphasize 
the way in which he differs drastically from our traditional narrator or even the other 
narrators in the novel.   Even my proposed top-down and schematized version of this 
observation cannot be definitively proven to be Benjy’s true intent when thinking in this 
way.  Because we have no way of knowing precisely what Benjy is experiencing during 
this scene, because we cannot be sure that he isn’t seeing with his hands or hearing the 
darkness fall in some way, we simply are left to accept Benjy’s view of the world, though 
it may differ greatly from our own. 
 One of the most well-known of Benjy’s de-familiarizing moments occurs with a 
box his sister Caddy gives him to calm him down during a fit: “Caddy got the box and set 
it on the floor and opened it.  It was full of stars.  When I was still, they were still.  When 
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I moved, they glinted and sparkled.  I hushed” (Faulkner, 1994).  Caddy’s box full of 
stars is such a beautiful image.  Benjy, when distressed, gets to look at these stars that 
mimic his movement.  He only sees the way the light glints off of the box’s contents.  He 
does not see the contents themselves except in noting that they resemble stars.  In class, I 
realized that this box of stars was, in reality, a jewelry box Caddy had opened up so that 
Benjy could watch the light from the fire glinting off the pieces within it.  I almost wish I 
had not figured that out, because the idea of something so magical as a box fully of 
moving stars existing pleases me far more than does imagining a jewelry box open in the 
firelight.  By the time this scene comes around, the reader is so invested in Benjy’s 
perceptions of the world as to not want to return to top-down modes of perception.  There 
is a disappointment there as some of the magic is taken out of the words, as the meaning 
of the image overshadows its materiality.  We want to inhabit his mindset again.  In this 
way, we ourselves become bottom-up thinkers even in our reading of the text.  The 
words, rather than their significance, are more captivating than the “real” scenes behind 
them.  The box of stars mesmerizes Benjy, just as the image and the poetic language 
mesmerize us.   
But this is how Benjy sees the world, as something slightly more wondrous and 
beautiful than the rest of us are capable of seeing.  It is possible that he would not even 
recognize his worldview as wondrous or beautiful, because this is his version of normal.  
As Cronin notes, “he sees one as the other,” meaning that he sees stars in a jewelry box 
and the sun as cold at night (2014).  This is not his way of attempting to find the right 
words but rather simply the reality he inhabits.  For many of us readers, though, Benjy’s 
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perceptions deviate greatly from our norms.  Because we are so de-familiarized from 
ourselves and from our lives, Benjy’s section truly can be considered an impressive 
example of artistic language, according to the previously established definitions of such 
language.  Our mental perceptions are prolonged in the difficulty of understanding the 
stimuli he describes.  We do not see “one as the other” so easily as Benjy does, and our 
version of reality seems much less interesting in comparison to Benjy’s simply because 
we have become habituated to ours and are unable to habituate easily to Benjy’s at all. 
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Through Jason’s eyes: top-down consequences in The Sound and the 
Fury
Jason’s top-down habitualization 
A stark and unwanted contrast to Benjy, the third of The Sound and the Fury’s 
narrators is Jason Compson, Benjy’s brother.  Whereas Benjy focused on the materiality 
of his environment, using bottom-up methods of perception, Jason exclusively exists in a 
top-down, categorical world.  In fact, he is all category, all the time, with few—if any—
instances of cross-modal language in his narration.  The problem with existing so far on 
one end of the perceptual spectrum is that habitualization occurs entirely too easily when 
strict categories are always in place.  As Shklovsky points out, “Habitualization devours 
work, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the fear of war” (Shklovsky, 1965).  
Habitualization, in other words, devours the everyday life that someone like Jason lives, a 
life absent of bottom-up thinking, a life dictated by schema self-imposed and never 
questioned.  Benjy, in his unique perception of life, avoids all of this.  Even his 
understanding of the moon varies significantly from how most others would describe it.  
By giving us an entirely new perspective, Faulkner ensures that the reader cannot 
habituate to Benjy’s section, and, of course, by seeing the world from an entirely new and 
different perspective, the reader therefore gains a new experience of the world that in 
itself cannot fit with the reader’s existing, habituated perception of it.  Benjy’s poetic 
observations are therefore more appealing, more outwardly artistic, than Jason’s practical 
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and efficient language.  This creates a unique opportunity for the reader to feel more 
strongly for Benjy’s beautiful prose, regardless of the difficulty that arises when trying to 
“make sense” of his section, than they do for Jason’s economy of mental effort, because 
it is so standard in its top-down views. 
Fittingly, Jason’s chapter is perhaps the most comprehensible of all of the 
chapters, beginning, “Once a bitch always a bitch, what I say” (Faulkner, 1929/1994).  
Jason speaks and thinks in a way that is not difficult to understand for most readers.  His 
thoughts and opinions may be despicable, as is probably evidenced by that opening line 
of his, but even still, his language is comprehensible.  His section therefore offers the 
greatest opportunity for economical, top-down processing.  There is nothing new about 
the sexism and racism he embodies throughout his narration.  His descriptions are 
obvious and simple.  His language, according to Shklovsky’s definition, is largely 
practical and very unlike the poetic language observed in Benjy’s chapter.  This results in 
the reader being exposed to an already habituated mindset and a relative poverty of 
descriptive language in comparison to the previous two sections, making it that much 
more unremarkable.  
Whereas Benjy, in his section, continually confused his senses, Jason is very 
straightforward in reporting particular sensations and the sense modality to which they 
correspond.  He notes, “I could see the empty keyhole, but I couldn’t hear a sound;” 
“There wasn’t any light close and I couldn’t see her face much.  But I could feel her 
looking at me;” and “I couldn’t hear him, only the bottom of his nightshirt and his bare 
legs in front of the sideboard” (Faulkner, 1929/1994).  In each of these, a particular 
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stimulus corresponds directly and exclusively to a particular sense modality.  Jason sees 
the keyhole; he feels eyes on him; he hears the sounds of someone trying to be quiet at 
the sideboard.  Jason’s ability to separate the senses in such a way directly contrasts 
Benjy’s assertion, “I couldn’t see it, but my hands saw it, and I could hear it getting 
night…” (Faulkner, 1929/1994).  Benjy is able to see things with his hands and hear 
darkness falling in a way that Jason—limited in his strict uni-modality—cannot do.  
Jason sees and hears and feels things in the barest, most realistic sense, never allowing 
two senses to infringe on one another.  
Beyond merely keeping categories separated in this way, Jason also imposes 
schemata much more stringently upon stimuli in order to bypass all extraneous 
information.  On two occasions, he specifically observes the effects of light on a scene, 
though he always knows precisely what is causing that light to be there: “She struck the 
match and lit the check and put it in the shovel, and then the envelope, and watched them 
burn”; “Only she couldn’t see into the door because the sun fell straight into it and it was 
like trying to see through an automobile searchlight” (Faulkner, 1929/1994).  In the first 
instance, he sees the flame and, though the light of it is undoubtedly striking, he only sees 
it for what it truly is in essence.  In the second instance, he again notes a bright light, this 
time coming from the sun’s reflection on the door, and, again, he is not distracted by the 
stimulus on his way to determining, through top-down processing, the cause of it.  When 
Benjy finds himself faced with light stimulus in the form of the reflection of the fire on 
Caddy’s jewelry, he does not impose this same sort of schemata onto what he sees; 
instead, he views the light-reflecting stimulus as being a box full of stars.  Jason’s 
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imposition of top-down schemata prevents him from viewing the world in a way that is as 
beautiful or as poetic as Benjy’s.  Instead, his plain realism provides the average reader 
with no outlooks different than their own and allows them to habituate to his imagery. 
One of the clearest contrasts between Benjy’s bottom-up fixation on stimuli and 
Jason’s top-down realistic interpretation occurs when Jason goes to find a special box of 
his own.  He notes, “I told Mother goodnight and went on to my room and got the box 
and counted it again” (Faulkner, 1994).  Jason does not even take a moment to consider 
the appearance of the box or its contents.  He immediately goes about counting his 
money.  Benjy, fascinated with Caddy’s box of stars, moves in order to observe the light 
flickering in different contexts.  He becomes so absorbed in the glinting and sparkling of 
these “stars” that he hushes, a feat not easily accomplished throughout his appearances in 
the novel.  Jason spends no time becoming absorbed or entranced at the sight of his 
special box.  His top-down, rigidly categorical view of the world does not permit that sort 
of intense distraction by a stimulus.  These two boxes and their perceptual influences 
become symbolic of the narrators’ worldviews themselves—one box is enchanting for the 
sensations it produces, for the stimuli it elicits; one is privileged only for what it contains.  
Bottom-up and top-down distinctions present particularly clearly here, obviously 
differentiating the two chapters. 
All of what I have described of Jason’s section so far indicates that he exists 
solely in the realm of top-down and uni-modal thinking, that his world can only be 
described using practical language and is therefore not considered true literature by 
Shklovsky’s definition.  There is at least one instance, though, wherein Jason uses a 
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rather colorful and unique simile to describe the look of his niece without make-up on: 
“She hadn’t gotten around to painting herself yet and her face looked like she had 
polished it with a gun rag” (Faulkner, 1929/1994).  To polish one’s face with a gun rag 
implies a certain gun-ness in countenance, and considering the fact that guns are neither 
pretty nor feminine, we might assume that this observation about his niece is Jason’s way 
of criticizing her appearance without make-up, perhaps suggesting that she looks harsh 
and undesirable like this.  While his hateful criticism (coming after repeated snide 
comments about how she looks with her face “painted,” meaning that his niece 
apparently cannot win in his eyes) might upset readers, this image is nothing if not 
colorful.  It certainly prolongs mental effort in a way that makes it an example of poetic 
language.  Even still, the use of simile here instead of stating her gun-rag-face as a fact 
still prevents the reader from being de-familiarized in the way that they are in Benjy’s 
section.  Jason compares one state to another—an absence of make-up to being polished 
by a gun rag—whereas Benjy, to again use Cronin’s words, “sees one as the other” 
(2014).  Because of this, the reader still remains firmly fixed in this practical mindset, not 
even inhabiting an alternate worldview for one vivid description, and this brief dalliance 
with artistic language is not enough to really pull Jason’s section from the far, top-down 
end of the processing spectrum. 
Because Jason’s categorical perceptions are so rigid and so unmoving, his view of 
the world does not differ from the standard one that many people have.  Granted, he is 
incredibly racist and sexist, which should and does appall readers, but there is nothing 
groundbreaking about the style of his thoughts.  Whereas Benjy provides people with an 
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alternative outlook, one that hangs on every interesting smell or taste or sight without 
recognizing that it belongs to any of those categories exclusively, Jason’s section presents 
life as any realist writer might present it.  Because his perceptions align so closely with 
those of many people, his experiences generally become the sort of practical language 
Shklovsky warns artists against, the kind that shortens time of perception instead of 
lengthening it.  To reiterate one of his main points, “After we see an object several times, 
we begin to recognize it.  The object is in front of us and we know about it, but we do not 
see it—hence we cannot say anything significant about it” (Shklovsky, 1965).  Jason’s 
chapter is every bit this recognition of certain images and modes of perception.  Nothing 
revolutionary occurs in reading his prose, save for that one compelling simile.  Indeed, 
nothing revolutionary can occur, according to Shklovsky’s theory, because we are so 
familiar with the images Jason presents as to have nothing new or novel to say about 
them. 
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The spectrum of processing, the spectrum of writing
This discussion of Jason’s section and its dryness is by no means meant to 
aggravate Faulkner-lovers.  Instead, it merely illustrates the ways in which one author 
might utilize different modes of perception across the same work.  Writing does not 
always need to be one or the other, similar to how individuals do not necessarily need to 
fall wholly on one side of the spectrum of processing types.  Writing, in all of its infinite 
possibilities, can incorporate pieces of both perceptual modes, making the work just 
familiar enough to establish a basis for the reader before de-familiarizing certain aspects 
of the world in order to still provide the reader with a different outlook on familiar 
objects and events.  Faulkner exemplifies this particularly well, if only because he 
includes two extreme narratives from either end of the bottom-up-top-down spectrum 
within the same novel. 
 
Quentin’s top-down disintegration 
Benjy and Jason are two extreme examples, but along with this principle of a 
processing spectrum, there are other ways to write which might incorporate both top-
down and bottom-up modes of viewing the world.  Quentin’s section, which appears 
immediately after Benjy’s, delves into cross-modal language as Quentin’s logical thought 
processes begin to break down when he becomes overwhelmed with his memories.  
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Quentin is brother to both Benjy and Jason and is away at Harvard during his section, 
where his extreme introspection and depression plague him incessantly.  
Quentin’s section starts coherently enough: “When the shadow of the sash 
appeared on the curtains it was between seven and eight oclock and then I was in time 
again, hearing the watch” (Faulkner, 1929/1994).  While being “in time” is not exactly 
straightforward, it does not take long for the reader to understand that Quentin means that 
he is transported back in his memory to a time when he heard a watch.  We quickly learn 
that it was given to him by his father with a very specific message: “I give it to you not 
that you may remember time, but that you might forget it now and then for a moment and 
not spend all your breath trying to conquer it” (Faulkner, 1929/1994).  Given that Quentin 
begins by discussing being “in time again,” we can assume that he probably has not 
followed his father’s advice.  Even still, while these opening lines are descriptive about 
his character, just as Jason’s opening line (“Once a bitch always a bitch”) aptly describes 
him, they do not yet prolong mental effort to the point that Benjy’s section did.  While 
not practical in the least, these words still allow for top-down processing as we know it.  
As the section progresses, this categorical language begins to falter.  Constantly 
assailed by the past, Quentin’s narration mirrors Benjy’s when his invasive thoughts 
become particularly bad: “…hands can see touching in the mind shaping unseen door 
Door now nothing hands can see    My nose could see gasoline, the vest on the table, the 
door” (Faulkner, 1929/1994).  As with Benjy’s assertion that “my hands saw it,” Quentin 
here gives his hands the ability to see.  He goes slightly further, even, and claims that his 
“nose could see gasoline,” which is similar to the way in which Benjy described being 
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able to “smell the bright cold” moon.  Touch and sight are confused here, and smell and 
sight remain equally blurred.  Interestingly, “the vest on the table, the door” are two 
additional objects described as being seen by Quentin’s nose.  With gasoline, we know 
that his nose can smell it, not see as he claims, but for these other objects, they likely 
cannot be smelled.  Even within his distinct sentence confusing the senses, he is not 
consistent in what exactly is being confused.  Here, instead of his nose smelling these 
things, it is his eyes seeing them—or, at least, it should be by normative definitions of 
senses and their capabilities.  Like with Benjy’s section, this creates a prolongation of 
perception and a materiality around the stimuli being described, therefore making these 
passages examples of poetic language. 
Interestingly, Quentin’s movement from top-down to bottom-up, from uni-modal 
to cross-modal, seems to correspond to his declining mental health.  This makes no 
comments on the mental health of those who regularly engage in bottom-up or cross-
modal thinking and instead merely reflects the ways in which top-down imposition of 
schemata is emphasized even in those who might not have preferred that mode of 
thinking themselves.  In other words, Quentin’s learned categorization appears not to be 
the way in which his mind generally works, as he is only able to maintain it when only 
one or two things are on his mind.  He is unable to reflect on the past or on his life 
without devolving into increasingly poetic and de-familiarizing language.  This might be 
an automatic response of his when he can no longer focus on thinking the way in which 
others have told him to think.   
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Dilsey’s poetic perceptions 
The final section of The Sound and the Fury once again alters the perspective 
from which the story is told.  As previously noted, this automatically has a de-
familiarizing effect while also presenting the reader with multiple different viewpoints to 
temporarily inhabit.  With this final section of the novel, though, Faulkner also switches 
to third person narration, breaking from the established pattern of first person.  This 
concluding portion of the narrative follows Dilsey, the matriarch of the Compson 
family’s servants.  While her language consistently dips into the poetic form, it does not 
always occupy that bottom-up mode of perception.  At one point, for example, she notes, 
“[Benjy] came obediently, wailing, that slow hoarse sound that ships make, that seems to 
begin before the sound itself has started, seems to cease before the sound itself has 
stopped” (Faulkner, 1929/1994).  This description of Benjy’s cries is certainly colorful 
and interesting, and the reader—at least in my case—is struck by the seemingly haunted 
quality of the noise that ends before it ends and begins before it begins.  However, the 
noise here is directly compared to other noise, keeping the description within one discrete 
category and comparing things rather than directly equating them.  This is indeed poetic 
language, just as Quentin’s opening is also poetic, but it still exists in a top-down realm. 
Later in the novel, bottom-up processing is induced a bit more clearly, and at an 
Easter service at her church, Dilsey observes of the preacher,  
With his body he seemed to feed the voice that, succubus like, had fleshed its 
teeth in him.  And the congregation seemed to watch with its own eyes while the 
voice consumed him, until he was nothing and they were nothing and there was 
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not even a voice but instead their hearts were speaking to one another in chanting 
measures beyond the need for words… (Faulkner, 1929/1994). 
This, in contrast to the earlier example of Dilsey’s descriptive language, certainly 
prolongs perception in its dismissal of top-down categories.  “Voice” and “teeth” are 
generally not descriptors that intersect.  “Biting” as a characteristic might be related to a 
voice or to words, but “teeth” generally is not.  Additionally, “heart” and “chanting” are 
typically not associated, and while I have certainly read romantic poetry in which the 
heart is seen to speak, it is generally not in this religious, almost surreal moment of 
chanting to a priest that has been consumed by the power of his own voice. 
 
Neither one nor the other 
  Both Quentin and Dilsey present examples of bottom-up and top-down language 
in their stories.  Quentin appears to favor bottom-up throughout his introspection and 
remembrance, whereas Dilsey strays slightly more toward the top-down end of the 
spectrum.  The existence of their sections in the novel serves as a perfect counterpoint to 
Benjy and Jason’s extremist modes of perception.  All together, these narratives help to 
clearly illustrate the different ways in which people perceive the world.  Faulkner 
probably was not attempting to specifically show the effect of cross-modality and 
categorization on the induction of either bottom-up or top-down processing in turn, but 
even if it was unintentional, the characters here and the words that they use result in the 
reader experiencing all aspects of this spectrum.  This provides a very realistic view of 
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the general composition of our world, in that binaries like top-down/bottom-up do not 
exist.  There is always a spectrum, and assuming otherwise stifles certain perspectives.   
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Conclusion
Real-world significance of bottom-up processing 
It is, of course, fascinating for someone studying literature like myself to examine 
the different techniques at work in a novel as variable as The Sound and the Fury, but the 
degree to which these implications carry into everyday life might not seem all that great 
at this moment.  We have seen the different effects of cross-modality, as in Benjy’s 
chapter, and uni-modality, as in Jason’s, on our perception of how artistic a given 
selection of text can be.  According to Shklovsky’s definition of art as that which 
prolongs mental perception, Benjy is far more artistic a narrator than Jason, who provides 
the reader with the very basest economy of mental effort.  However, Benjy’s section, in 
all of its bottom-up, cross-modal glory, also plays an important role in providing a new 
way of thinking for readers that might allow them to feel empathy for those who think in 
a non-top-down way.  Even Quentin and Dilsey, with their combination of processing 
styles, permit the reader to inhabit a slightly different mindset than might be typical in a 
lot of literature. 
 
Those excluded in strictly categorical narratives 
I have previously discussed the way synesthesia might link to cross-modal 
language in literature, so inducing a bottom-up processing mode when reading clearly 
can allow a non-synesthete reader to empathize with synesthetic experiences.  Bottom-up 
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processing remains more prevalent than “normal” in those with autism as well.  Both of 
these conditions involve increased local connectivity in the brain and may very well be 
genetically linked (Neufeld et al. 2013; Courchesne et al. 2009; Haenggi, Wotruba, & 
Jancke, 2011; Casanova & Trippe, 2009; Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2005).  Categories 
are not nearly as rigid in these conditions, as that increased connectivity allows for 
“cross-talk” between certain modalities that might otherwise be kept distinct.   
I also mentioned previously that this cross-modal thinking that occurs in 
synesthetes and those with autism is suspected to be latent and to be slowly over-written 
over time.  Even still, some of these inherent connections remain into adulthood and 
manifest in the form of acknowledging sound symbolism or being able to form letter-
color patterns when prompted (Coulter & Coulter, 2013; Rich et al., 2005; Simner et al., 
2005).  If literary tradition continues to solely perpetuate top-down views, then not only 
will those who favor the other processing type be alienated, but the top-down restricted 
writing will also limit “typical” people in their experiences.  As seen with the “ba” and 
“ga” example, a certain degree of cross-modality is inherent in general in people (Tsur, 
1992).  Without literature that engages this cross-modality, that encourages bottom-up 
processing, everyone is restricted in their worldviews, even those who might assume that 
they fall on the Jason-esque top-down end of the spectrum.  This strict adherence to only 
one’s own worldview prevents an understanding dialogue to form between individuals, 
leading to a sense of isolation and an inability to successfully communicate with one 
another than can have real-world implications on such things as our political climate or 
general interpersonal relations. 
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Importance of empathy in the world 
 But why should we be worried about limiting ourselves to top-down views?  The 
world is not a kind place to many people.  Many psychoanalytic schools of thought posit 
that an individual’s self-identification is based on differentiating who they are from some 
other, some not-self.  Some suggest that, in terms of characteristics, “what is unwanted is 
split off and projected onto the other” (Layton, 2009).  The stark polarization of “us vs. 
them” therefore becomes exaggerated through this process of projecting unwanted parts 
of “us” onto “them.”  Additionally, Hogg (2007) found that “people increase group 
identification in response to threats to self-certainty.”  Identifying with an “us” group 
consquently becomes an incredibly important part of individual identity, with a 
subsequent loss of certainty in identity when that “us” group identity is disrupted (Slotter, 
Winger, & Soto, 2015).  Unfortunately, this can have negative implications for those 
perceived as a “them” group, including people with disabilities or those who just seem 
“different.”  With the possibility for such large group stratification between “us” and 
“them,” empathy for the not-self groups can become jeopardized. 
 This is where literature can offer some assistance.  Through cross-modal 
language, through stories that create an artistic confusion between senses, the mental 
effort of the reader will be prolonged, and they will become accustomed to viewing the 
world in a new way.  This automatically blurs the line between “the self” and “the other,” 
in that the reader now understands an alternative viewpoint that might have previously 
belonged to an “other.”  In doing this, literary works—especially those that utilize cross-
modal language and promote bottom-up perceptions—provide a way to make the 
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occasionally harsh dichotomy of “us vs. them” a bit less severe in its categorization.  In 
reading works that promote bottom-up or cross-modal perception of external stimuli, the 
reader is consequently placed in the mindset of someone who sees reality through a 
slightly varied approach.  Now, this might not cause a permanent shift in the reader’s 
own perceptions, but it will at the very least provide a temporary change in which they 
are able to see through the eyes of another.   
 The Oxford English Dictionary (2014) defines empathy as “the ability to 
understand and appreciate another person’s feelings, experiences, etc.”  So, if we can 
view the world through another’s eyes, we are literally feeling empathy for someone 
else’s experiences, and we can also begin to push back against “othering” someone or a 
group of people to the point of making their experiences inaccessible to us.  In creating 
this temporary condition wherein we inhabit someone else’s world while we read, 
literature therefore allows us as readers to become empathetic to individuals like the 
characters we are reading about.  
All of this might not be the overarching goal of an author like Faulkner who does 
include such empathetic characters in his work, but it still is an important effect resulting 
from that particular writing technique.  Because there are such a wide variety of 
individuals in the general population who might perceive their surroundings in a more 
cross-modal way, including this worldview in literature helps to invite these individuals 
into our literary tradition and allows us to more deeply connect with those we might have 
previously pushed away in our own quest for self-identification.  
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